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Part V
The Scope of Charter Rights and
Redress
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Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator:
A “Frack-tious” Divide on Statutory
Immunities and Charter Damages
Joseph Cheng and Andrew Law*

I. OVERVIEW
In Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator,1 the Supreme Court of Canada
considered whether a statutory immunity provision could bar a plaintiff
from bringing a claim for Charter2 damages against an administrative
tribunal, and, if so, whether the provision was itself unconstitutional.
On these issues, the Court deeply divided. Four justices, led by
Cromwell J., held that the statutory immunity provision in Alberta’s
Energy Resources Conservation Act3 barred Ms. Ernst’s claim for Charter
damages, and that the provision itself was not unconstitutional. Four other
justices, led by McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver and Brown JJ., held that it
was not plain and obvious that the statutory immunity provision barred the
claim for Charter damages and in so determining, deemed it unnecessary
to consider the constitutional issue. The remaining judge, Abella J., wrote a
separate decision that agreed with Cromwell J. on the issue of whether the
*
Joseph Cheng is Senior Counsel and Andrew Law is Counsel with the Department of
Justice Canada, National Litigation Sector (Ontario Regional Office). The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors only and do not represent the views of the Minister of Justice and
Attorney General of Canada, the Department of Justice Canada, or the Government of Canada. The
authors wish to express their deepest thanks to Elizabeth Koudys, Counsel, Department of Justice
Canada, for her excellent research and editorial assistance on this paper, and to Michael H. Morris,
Senior General Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, and Heather MacKinnon, General Counsel,
Department of Justice Canada for their insights and comments.
1
[2017] S.C.J. No. 1, 2017 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ernst”].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
R.S.A. 2000, c. E-10 [hereinafter “ERCA”]. The ERCA was repealed and replaced with
the Responsible Energy Development Act, S.A. 2012, c. R-17.3, proclaimed June 17, 2013 but the
ERCA remained the applicable statute in force at the time of the allegations from Ms. Ernst’s Fresh
Claim: Ernst v. EnCana Corp., [2013] A.J. No. 1045, 2013 ABQB 537, at para. 9 (Alta. Q.B.)
[hereinafter “Ernst (QB)”].
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provision barred Ms. Ernst’s claim, but held that it was inappropriate to
consider the constitutional question, as this issue was being raised de novo
before the Supreme Court of Canada.
In many ways, the divisions on display in Ernst reflect the nature of
the difficult public law issues before it. Ernst required the Court to
consider, among other issues, the availability of Charter damages against
an administrative tribunal, the applicability of statutory immunity
provisions with respect to constitutional claims, and the appropriateness
of scrutinizing the constitutional validity of legislation de novo at the
Supreme Court of Canada.
To help make sense of the Court’s attempt to grapple with these
issues, this paper provides an overview of the competing opinions in
order to answer a basic yet difficult question: what exactly did the Court
decide? Next, this paper attempts to situate Ernst within larger recent
debates in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, particularly with respect to
section 24(1) of the Charter. In doing so, it seeks to address Ernst’s
practical meaning and, in particular, its broader implications with respect
to the constitutionality of immunities, both common law and statutory.

II. BACKGROUND
1. Ms. Ernst’s Claim Against the Regulator Was Part of a Larger
Claim Involving EnCana Corporation and the Province of
Alberta
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst involves one aspect of a larger
civil action that was commenced by Jessica Ernst against three separate
parties, including the Energy Resources Conservation Board (the
predecessor to the Alberta Energy Regulator,4 the “Regulator”).
Ms. Ernst owns land near the hamlet of Rosebud in southern Alberta.
All of her claims related to allegations that EnCana Corporation had
damaged her fresh water supply, through fracking and other activities
near her property. In addition to suing EnCana, Ms. Ernst sued both the
province of Alberta and the Regulator.
As against Alberta, Ms. Ernst alleged that the province owed her a
duty to protect her water supply, and that it failed to adequately respond
4
At the time of Ms. Ernst’s original claim, the Board was known as the Energy Resources
Conservation Board. Pursuant to the Responsible Energy Development Act, the Board has been
succeeded by the Alberta Energy Regulator: see Ernst (QB), id., at para. 9.
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to her complaints regarding EnCana.5 As against the Regulator, Ms. Ernst
claimed negligence in respect of its regulation of EnCana. She further
claimed that the Regulator violated her section 2(b) rights under the
Charter (freedom of expression) when, from November 2005 to March
2007, it refused to accept communications from her as it considered her
prior communications to be of a threatening nature.6
Ms. Ernst originally commenced her claim in December 2007. She
amended her claim in both April 2011 and again in February 2012. She
also filed a Fresh Claim in June 2012.7
2. The Original Applications to Strike the Claim
Both the Regulator and Alberta applied in the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench to strike the portions of the Fresh Claim that related to
them, either in whole or in part.8
The Regulator argued it was “plain and obvious” that Ernst’s claim in
negligence could not succeed because as a statutory body, the Regulator
could not owe Ms. Ernst a private law duty of care.9 With respect to the
Charter claim, the Regulator argued that Charter protection does not
extend to situations where there are threats or acts of violence, and
section 2(b) does not “include the right to an audience.”10 The Regulator
further argued that Ms. Ernst was out of time for bringing her Charter
claim.
Finally, the Regulator argued that, in any event, the immunity
provision found in section 43 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act
acted as an absolute bar to the action, including Ms. Ernst’s claim for
Charter damages. That section provides:
43. No action or proceeding may be brought against the Board or a
member of the Board or a person referred to in section 10 or 17(1) in
respect of any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance of this Act, or
any Act that the Board administers, the regulations under any of those
Acts or a decision, order or direction of the Board.

5
Ernst v. Alberta (Energy Resources Conservation Board), [2014] A.J. No. 975, 2014
ABCA 285, at para. 2 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Ernst (CA)”].
6
Id., at para. 3; Ernst (QB), supra, note 3, at paras. 36-38.
7
Ernst (QB), id., at para. 4.
8
Id.
9
Id., at para. 18.
10
Id., at paras. 35-37.
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Alberta’s application was much more limited in scope. It argued that
various paragraphs or portions of paragraphs in the Claim should have
been struck as these were “‘frivolous, irrelevant or improper’”.11
3. The Court of Queen’s Bench Allows the Regulator’s Application
and Dismisses Alberta’s Application
Chief Justice Wittmann granted the Regulator’s application to strike
the portions of the claim relating to it for three reasons:
1. The Regulator could not owe a duty of care to Ms. Ernst and for that
reason, it was “plain and obvious” her claims in negligence against
the Regulator could not succeed.12
2. Subject to section 43 of the ERCA and any applicable limitations
period, Ernst’s Charter claim was valid.
3. However, all of Ms. Ernst’s claims against the Regulator, including
the Charter claims, were barred by section 43 of the ERCA.
In considering whether section 43 could apply to Ms. Ernst’s Charter
claims, Wittmann C.J.Q.B. held that there were strong policy reasons that
supported this determination. In particular, he cited McLachlin C.J.C.’s
articulation of countervailing factors against awarding Charter damages
in Vancouver (City) v. Ward,13 namely the existence of alternative
remedies and concerns over good governance.14 Moreover, Wittmann
C.J.Q.B. held that there was a real fear that allowing Charter claims
to defeat statutory immunity clauses would create an inappropriate
“end-run” around such clauses:
The mischief that arises circumventing an otherwise valid immunity
provision is obvious. Parties would come to the litigation process
dressed in their Charter clothes whenever possible.15

Finally, Wittman C.J.Q.B. held that if the constitutional validity of
section 43 were at issue, a Notice of Constitutional Question should have
been provided to the Attorneys General of Alberta and Canada. On this
11

Id., at para. 101.
Ernst v. EnCana Corp., [2014] A.J. No. 1259, 2014 ABQB 672, at paras. 28-29 (Alta. Q.B.).
13
[2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”]; Ernst (QB), supra,
note 3, at para. 84.
14
Ernst (QB), id., at paras. 85-89.
15
Id., at para. 81.
12
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point, he observed that while constitutional notice is a procedural
requirement, it is necessary to facilitate “full argument of any constitutional
issues” and is “a matter of procedural fairness” to the relevant Attorneys
General.16
Chief Justice Wittmann dismissed Alberta’s application, noting that
while the pleadings may not have been perfectly drafted, “[n]othing of
substance” would turn on having Ernst substitute the various
impugned language in the claim. He went on to note on this point that
“[t]inkering with pleadings ... is not, in this case, useful to the
advancement of the action”.17 Alberta does not appear to have
appealed this determination.
4. A Unanimous Panel of the Alberta Court of Appeal Affirms the
Court of Queen’s Bench’s Decision
Ms. Ernst appealed, and a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal
dismissed her appeal. The Court upheld Wittman C.J.Q.B.’s
determinations on negligence, and upheld his determination on section 43
of the ERCA. At the Court of Appeal, Ms. Ernst did not challenge the
constitutional validity of section 43.18
With respect to section 43, the Court held that there was “nothing
constitutionally illegitimate” about applying statutory immunity
provisions in the context of Charter claims.19 Citing the same passage
from Ward setting out the countervailing factors that would render
section 24(1) damages inappropriate,20 the Court of Appeal noted that
an effective avenue of redress did exist for Ms. Ernst’s Charter
complaint — judicial review.21 As a result, the Court concluded that the
lower court made no reviewable error in striking the claim as against
the Regulator.22

16

Id., at para. 89.
Id., at para. 130.
18
On this point, see Abella J.’s decision where she notes that Ms. Ernst did not challenge
the constitutional validity of s. 43 at the Court of Appeal and indeed, argued that as such, she did not
have to file a Notice of Constitutional Question before that court: Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 124.
19
Ernst (CA), supra, note 5, at para. 30.
20
Id., at para. 29, citing Ward, supra, note 13, at paras. 33, 40.
21
Ernst (CA), id., at para. 30.
22
Id.
17

186

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

5. The Supreme Court Dismisses the Appeal, But Divides Sharply
Ms. Ernst sought and received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada. The appeal focused solely on issues relating to the
applicability of section 43.23 On these issues, the Court struggled to
resolve the key questions before it, namely:
1. whether a claim for Charter damages should be struck out on the
basis of a statutory immunity clause; and
2. if so, whether the statutory immunity clause is itself unconstitutional.
A majority of five judges — per Cromwell J., writing for a plurality
of four judges and Abella J., on her own — upheld the lower courts’
determination that Ms. Ernst’s Charter claim was barred by section 43 of
the ERCA.
But a differently configured majority of five judges — per McLachlin
C.J.C. and Moldaver and Brown JJ. (the “McLachlin C.J.C. plurality”),
writing for themselves and for Côté J., and Abella J., writing on her own
— held that the constitutional issues should be left for another day.
The ultimate result was that the appeal was dismissed and Ms. Ernst’s
claims were struck. However, the decision leaves us with no majority
decision on the question of whether the statutory immunity provision is
unconstitutional.
6. A Plurality of Judges Led by Cromwell J. Would Have Upheld
the Lower Courts’ Decisions
In his plurality decision, Cromwell J. upheld the Court of Appeal’s
determination that section 43 barred Ms. Ernst’s claims.
Justice Cromwell begins his discussion by setting out section 43, his
underscoring of certain passages emphasizing the broad and encompassing
nature of the provision: “No action or proceeding may be brought against
the Board … in respect of any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance
of this Act … or a decision, order or direction of the Board.”24 Justice
Cromwell observed that there was “virtually no argument” regarding the
correct statutory interpretation of section 43, because it was “common

23
24

Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 8.
Id., at para. 9 (emphasis in original).
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ground between the parties” that “on its face”, the provision barred
Ms. Ernst’s claim for Charter damages.25
He went further, stating that it “was not open to the Court”26 to
conclude, as the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality did, that it was not plain and
obvious that section 43 barred the claim. Justice Cromwell made this
determination for two key reasons:
1. Ernst’s position, at all levels of court (including before the Supreme
Court), was that the immunity clause formed a complete bar to her
claim.27 To reach a different conclusion would be unfair to the Board,
which would be deprived of the opportunity to make submissions on
the issue;28 and
2. to determine that it was not plain and obvious that the provision
applied would cast doubt on the scope of all immunity provisions, a
result that would be “unnecessary, undesirable and unjustified.”29
Having found that the immunity provision barred the Charter claim,
the only question left, in Cromwell J.’s opinion, was whether section 43
was, as Ms. Ernst claimed, constitutionally invalid. If valid, then the
clause would apply as a complete bar.
On this point, Cromwell J. expressly considered the merits of the
Charter claim, even though they had been raised for the first time before
the Supreme Court. In so doing, he rejected the McLachlin C.J.C.
plurality’s suggestion (which was also adopted by Abella J.) that the
Court ought not to conduct a constitutional review on the basis of an
inadequate record. Justice Cromwell pointed out that if the record were
inadequate, the appropriate result would also be to dismiss the
constitutional challenge.30
Applying Ward,31 Cromwell J. concluded that Charter damages would
never be an appropriate remedy against the Regulator. Here, he focused
on Ward’s identification of two countervailing factors that may weigh
25

Id., at para. 10.
Id., at para. 11.
27
Justice Cromwell does, however, agree that the Court is not bound by the legal
submissions made by the parties before it, citing R. v. Sappier, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, 2006 SCC 54,
at para. 62 (S.C.C.); Ernst, id., at para. 15.
28
Ernst, id., at para. 16.
29
Id., at para. 17.
30
Id., at paras. 20-23, pointing out that there is a presumption of constitutional validity and
it is the Charter applicant who bears the burden of demonstrating that an impugned law is
unconstitutional.
31
Supra, note 13.
26
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against the award of damages in the Charter context: “where there is an
effective alternative remedy or where damages would be contrary to the
demands of good governance.”32
In Ms. Ernst’s case, both of these factors, together with the concern
over undermining the purpose of the statutory provision, inexorably led
Cromwell J. to the conclusion that damages would not be an appropriate
and just remedy for any Charter breaches found against the Regulator.33
In Cromwell J.’s view, the availability of judicial review was important
for two reasons. First, judicial review is meant to provide substantial,
effective and timely Charter relief. Second, the availability of judicial
review distinguishes this case from others in which the Court has crafted an
elevated liability threshold in preference to a complete immunity.34
With respect to good governance concerns, Cromwell J. noted that
concerns taken from the law of proximity in negligence are apposite.
Allowing claimants to bring claims for damages against the Board would
have the potential of depleting the Board’s resources, resulting in
“defensive actions” that would chill the Board’s ability to carry out its
statutory duties effectively. Moreover, immunity from civil claims for
quasi-judicial and regulatory decision-makers ensures that the Board is
free from interference and able to make fair and effective decisions
without the distraction of litigation.35
Finally, Cromwell J. held that it would not be proper to have the
Court conduct a case-by-case analysis of whether the particular claim for
Charter damages was, or was not covered by the immunity provision.
In his view, it would frustrate the purpose of immunity clauses if a mere
pleading of an allegation could call into question a decision-maker’s
conduct for which she would otherwise be immune.36
7. A Separate Plurality Led by McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver
and Brown JJ. Would Have Allowed the Appeal
The McLachlin C.J.C. plurality disagreed sharply with Cromwell J.
on both issues. The plurality would have allowed the appeal for the
reason that it was not plain and obvious that the statutory immunity
provision barred the Charter claims.
32
33
34
35
36

Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 26 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 31.
Id., at paras. 34-38.
Id., at para. 47.
Id., at paras. 56-57.
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In their view, Cromwell J. conducted the analysis in reverse. The
McLachlin C.J.C. plurality held that the appropriate template for
assessing these issues is to determine:
1. first, whether it is plain and obvious that Charter damages could not
be an appropriate and just remedy; and
2. if so, whether “it is plain and obvious that the immunity clause, on its
face, applies to [the plaintiff’s] claim for Charter damages.”
Only if both of these conditions had been satisfied would the McLachlin
C.J.C. plurality have struck the claim.37
Applying the framework from Ward, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality
concluded that it was not plain and obvious that Charter damages were
an inappropriate or unjust remedy. On the first step of the Ward
framework, they held that Ms. Ernst had properly pleaded her Charter
claim, i.e., that there were pleaded facts which, assumed to be true, could
sustain a Charter breach. The Regulator had told Ernst to stop expressing
herself to the media, to the public and prevented her from participating in
the Board’s public complaints process. According to the McLachlin
C.J.C. plurality, both of these elements were sufficient for the section 2(b)
claim to survive a motion to strike.38
On the second step, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality assessed the
question of whether damages could fulfil one or more of the functions of
compensation, vindication or deterrence as articulated in Ward. On this
point, they held that Ms. Ernst had pleaded that “the Board’s actions
were punitive, arbitrary and retaliatory”, which is sufficient to establish
the functions of deterrence and vindication.39
On the fourth step of the Ward analysis, whether the quantum of
damages is appropriate and just, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality held that
this issue was best left for trial.40
The McLachlin C.J.C. plurality then moved on to consider the third
step of the Ward analysis, whether there were countervailing
considerations that make it plain and obvious that Charter damages would
not be appropriate and just. The plurality’s reasons on this point constitute
the bulk of its decision, as this was the definitive factor that led Cromwell J.
to dismiss the appeal.
37
38
39
40

Id., at para. 149.
Id., at paras. 158-159.
Id., at paras. 160-161.
Id., at para. 162.
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On these points, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality disagreed that the
availability of judicial review or concerns over good governance were
sufficient to conclude that Charter damages were not available here.
With respect to alternative remedies, they held that judicial review
would not achieve the same objectives as Charter damages, namely,
vindication of Charter rights and deterring future breaches. They noted,
moreover, that damages are not generally available as a remedy in
judicial review.41
With respect to good governance concerns, the McLachlin C.J.C.
plurality found that judicial and quasi-judicial immunity from liability may
constitute a compelling countervailing factor in some cases. The plurality
notes, however, that the Regulator was not acting in its adjudicative
capacity when it barred further communications with Ms. Ernst.42 On this
point, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality found that Cromwell J.’s decision
recognized too “broad” and “sweeping” an immunity for the Regulator:43
“Never has this Court held, simply because a governmental decisionmaker has an adjudicative role — or a prosecutorial role, or a ministerial
role — that Charter damages can never be an appropriate and just remedy,
regardless of the circumstances.”44
On a related note, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality did not agree that
concerns underlying the limitation of public authority liability in
negligence (i.e., excessive demands on resources, chilling effect on
fulfilling statutory duties and protection of quasi-judicial decisionmaking) are dispositive in the Charter context.
For these reasons, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality would not have
struck the claim against the Regulator as it was not plain and obvious
that section 43 is a complete bar to Ms. Ernst’s Charter claim. They held
that it was arguable that punitive acts by the Board fall outside the scope
of the immunity clause. While this position was not pursued by any party
on the appeal, the plurality notes that the Court is not bound by the
positions taken by the parties.
Moving on to the second step of the analysis, the McLachlin C.J.C.
plurality held that it was not necessary nor desirable to consider the
constitutional validity of section 43. First, given their finding that it was
not plain and obvious that the Charter claim could not proceed, it was
41
42
43
44

Id., at paras. 166-167.
Id., at paras. 168-175.
Id., at para. 177.
Id., at para. 176.
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unnecessary to consider the constitutional issue. Second, they agreed that
the record before the Court was not adequate to consider this issue.45
Finally, the McLachlin C.J.C. plurality indicated that had a court
eventually agreed that section 43 barred Ms. Ernst’s claim, it would then
be open to her to seek to have the provision declared unconstitutional.
At that point, the necessary Notice of Constitutional Question would
need to be provided to the Attorneys General.46
8. Justice Abella Casts the Deciding Vote in Favour of Dismissing
the Appeal
In a separate decision concurring with Cromwell J. in the result,
Abella J. held that the statutory immunity provision applied to bar the
claim. However, unlike Cromwell J., Abella J. held that it would be
inappropriate to consider the constitutional question as no Notice of
Constitutional Question had been filed.
Like Cromwell J., Abella J. held that the immunity contained in
section 43 was clear and unqualified, thus forming a complete bar to
Ernst’s claim.47 Justice Abella agreed that unless the clause were found to
be invalid, the lower courts were correct in striking out the claims against
the Regulator.
Having made this determination, Abella J. then dedicated the bulk of
her reasons to address why it would be inappropriate to determine the
constitutional issue, focusing in particular on the importance of Notices
of Constitutional Question. On this point, she noted that Notices of
Constitutional Question serve a “‘vital purpose’” by ensuring both that
courts have a full evidentiary record before invalidating legislation and
that governments are given the fullest opportunity to support the validity
of legislation.48
Citing Guindon v. Canada,49 Abella J. held that there was no basis to
allow Ms. Ernst to raise a new Charter issue for the first time at the
Supreme Court.50 She observed that the public interest requires that the
fullest and best evidence be put before the Court when it is asked to
decide constitutional issues. This requires participation of the appropriate
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id., at para. 189.
Id., at para. 190.
Id., at paras. 70-72.
Id., at para. 99.
[2015] S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41 (S.C.C.).
Ernst, supra, note 1, at para. 99.
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Attorneys General. In this case, the Attorney General of Alberta was
prevented from offering justificatory evidence for the Court’s
consideration.51
In this case in particular, Abella J. noted that Ms. Ernst’s attack on the
statutory immunity provision would have profound implications for
judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers who are protected by
statutory and common law immunities. These immunities protect
decision-makers’ independence and impartiality and thereby facilitate the
administration of justice. For this reason, the Supreme Court has
accepted that regulatory boards are immune from negligence claims that
arise from policy decisions.52
Interestingly, Abella J. opined that in her view, the Ward analysis
would likely have led to the same conclusion that Cromwell J. reached:
that Charter damages would likely not have been found to be an
“appropriate and just” remedy in Ms. Ernst’s case. Further, Abella J.
agreed with Cromwell J. that judicial review would have been the
appropriate procedure for challenging the Regulator’s actions.53
Ultimately, however, Abella J. emphasized that the question of whether
Charter damages could be an appropriate remedy requires a proper
consideration of the constitutionality of the immunity provision.54 On this
point, Abella J. concluded her decision by taking Ms. Ernst to task for
essentially advancing a new, contrary argument on the constitutional issue
in the Supreme Court. Contrary to previous positions taken in the lower
courts, Ms. Ernst explicitly challenged the constitutional validity of section
43 for the first time at the Supreme Court. As Abella J. noted, Ms. Ernst
did not provide proper notice to do so.55
Justice Abella commented that if permitted, such conduct would allow
an applicant to deprive the relevant Attorneys General and other parties
of the ability to meaningfully participate in the proceeding. Such conduct
in breach of the requirements of the jurisprudence and the governing
statutes, “should not be rewarded in this Court with redemptive
forgiveness.”56

51
52
53
54
55
56

Id., at para. 111.
Id., at para. 118.
Id., at paras. 123-127.
Id., at para. 123.
Id., at para. 124.
Id., at para. 125.
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9. Why Was the Court So Divided in Ernst?
By a narrow 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court in Ernst confirmed that
the statutory immunity provision in section 43 of the ERCA barred all of
Ms. Ernst’s claims, including those under the Charter. A different 5-4
majority, however, refused to consider the issue of whether the provision
was itself unconstitutional.
Fortunately, decisions from the Supreme Court that are as deeply split
as Ernst are rare.57 Not surprisingly, however, the decision and its
perceived lack of clarity from the Court has attracted a fair amount of
critical commentary.58
So why did the Court divide so deeply? At first blush, many of the
principles discussed in the various opinions are not new, but represent
re-articulations of settled principles in public law. These include:
 The unwillingness to decide constitutional cases in a factual vacuum:
From its earliest jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has held that
Charter cases should not be decided on the basis of an inadequate
factual record. The majority’s refusal to decide the constitutional
issue, particularly since it was raised in explicit fashion for the first
time at the Supreme Court, is consistent with settled jurisprudence on
this point.59
 Primacy of judicial review: Recent jurisprudence from the Supreme
Court has generally affirmed that where judicial review is available,
57
For example, similarly split decisions in constitutional cases have occurred in Chaoulli v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 2005 SCC 35 (S.C.C.)
(a 3-3-1 split decision over whether a prohibition on obtaining private health care violated the
Charter) and Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, 2010 SCC 61
(S.C.C.) (a 4-4-1 split decision over the constitutional validity of provisions of that Act). Note,
however, that the Court has more recently issued competing opinions in: Haaretz.com v. Goldhar,
[2018] S.C.J. No. 28, 2018 SCC 28 (S.C.C.); Groia v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 27, 2018 SCC 27 (S.C.C.); Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2018] S.C.J. No. 18, 2018 SCC 18 (S.C.C.) and Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du
personnel professional et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018
SCC 17 (S.C.C.).
58
See, for example, Dean Lorne Sossin, “Damaging the Charter: Ernst v. Alberta Energy
Regulator” (January 20, 2012), online: <thecourt.ca> [hereinafter “Sossin”]; Matthew Lewans,
“Damages for Unconstitutional Administrative Action? A Comment on Ernst v. Alberta Energy
Regulator” (2017) 30 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 379 [hereinafter “Lewans”]; Julia Kindrachuk,
“Statutory Immunity from Charter Damages: Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator” (2015) 78 Sask. L.
Rev. 379 [hereinafter “Kindrachuk”].
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See MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361-62 (S.C.C.);
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all issues, including constitutional issues, should be raised first in
this context.60
 Administrative bodies must be able to control their own processes:
The good governance concern identified by Cromwell J. aligns with
the general principle that adjudicative bodies must be able to control
their own processes. A corollary to this is that, similar to courts, they
must also be able to operate without undue fear of litigation.61
Despite this, the decision in Ernst is also reflective of a larger
ongoing debate in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the
availability of damages under section 24(1) of the Charter. In this regard,
there is a clear doctrinal tension as between Cromwell J.’s acceptance
that Charter damages would never be an appropriate remedy against the
Board and McLachlin C.J.C.’s case-specific application of the Ward
framework. In our view, it is this larger debate that goes some way
towards explaining why the Court split as it did in Ernst.
10. Situating Ernst Within the Court’s Section 24(1) Jurisprudence
One of the more compelling struggles in Ernst is its failure to provide
a substantive holding on arguably the most interesting issue before the
Court, namely, whether an immunity clause like section 43 of the ERCA
is contrary to the Charter.
The arguments made by Ms. Ernst and others was that section 24(1)
enshrines the right of a successful claimant to an appropriate Charter
remedy. Any limitation on the availability of such a remedy would
therefore be inconsistent with the Charter and of no force or effect.62 This
60
See Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board, [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, 2005 SCC 16, at
paras. 38-55 (S.C.C.); C.B. Powell Ltd v. Canada (Border Services Agency), [2010] F.C.J. No. 274,
2010 FCA 61, at paras. 30-31 (F.C.A.); Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia (Human
Rights Commission), [2012] S.C.J. No. 10, 2012 SCC 10, at paras. 35-37 (S.C.C.); Zellers Inc. v.
Royal Cobourg Centres Ltd., [2001] O.J. No. 3792, 156 O.A.C. 133, at para. 18 (Ont. C.A.). But, see
Canada (Attorney General) v. Telezone Inc., [2010] S.C.J. No. 62, 2010 SCC 62 (S.C.C.), where the
Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff alleges the elements of a private law cause of action, the
provincial court should not generally decline jurisdiction on the basis that the claim could be pursued
as an application for judicial review.
61
Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] S.C.J. No. 26, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
653, at 685 (S.C.C.); Prassad v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] S.C.J.
No. 25, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 560, at para 46 (S.C.C.); Keith v. Canada (Correctional Service), [2012]
F.C.J. No. 505, 2012 FCA 117, at para. 49 (F.C.A.); Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J.
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proposition flows from the basic principle of constitutional supremacy: the
Crown cannot immunize itself from effective constitutional relief by mere
grant of statutory immunity.
However, it is recognized that the discretion afforded to courts under
section 24(1) of the Charter is not absolute. The jurisprudence recognizes
numerous constitutionally valid qualifications that structure and limit the
exercise of section 24(1) powers.63
The limitations that have been placed upon section 24(1) generally
fall within three categories: (1) textual limitations imposed by the
requirement that a section 24(1) remedy be appropriate and just in
the circumstances; (2) limitations arising from concerns relating to
effective administration of the state; and (3) procedural limitations that
govern the adjudication of all cases, including claims for Charter relief.
In our view, it is only when these boundaries of section 24(1) are
understood that one can undertake a principled assessment of whether a
statutory grant of Crown immunity is constitutionally invalid.
(a) Textual Limitations on Section 24(1) Discretion
Section 24(1) of the Charter entrenches the judicial discretion to
provide an individual remedy for the infringement of Charter rights and
freedoms.64 The section states that: “Anyone whose rights or freedoms,
as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply
to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”
It is widely acknowledged that section 24(1) confers upon courts the
broadest of remedial authority. As McIntyre J. observed in R. v. Mills,65
“[i]t is difficult to imagine language which could give the court a wider
and less fettered discretion.”66 Moreover, like all provisions of
the Charter, section 24(1) is to be given a generous and expansive
interpretation: narrow, technical or legalistic approaches are to be
avoided.67
63
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SCC 62, at para. 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”].
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At the same time, the discretion afforded by section 24(1) is not
unconstrained. There are textual limitations arising from the requirement
that a Charter remedy be appropriate and just in the circumstances.
In interpreting this requirement, courts have developed certain broad
principles to guide the exercise of section 24(1) discretion. For instance,
the Supreme Court has recognized that an appropriate and just remedy is
one that is responsive to the facts and circumstances of a violation, such
that the remedy meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the
claimant.68
At the same time, an appropriate and just remedy must also be fair to
the party against which it is imposed. In this regard, the remedy should
not result in substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the right
at issue.69 The costs and practicalities, including the availability of
financial resources and competing demands on the public purse, are
therefore relevant considerations in assessing whether a remedy meets
the textual requirements of section 24(1).70
The identification of an appropriate and just remedy is also guided by
constitutional constraints on the role of the judiciary. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, section 24(1) is not an invitation for courts to
intrude upon legislative powers or to erase distinctions between branches
of government.71 With this in mind, it has been cautioned that an
appropriate and just remedy is one that is respectful of basic
constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers, and that does
not involve the courts in non-adjudicative functions, such as policymaking, that are beyond the expertise of the judiciary.72 In crafting a
Charter remedy, therefore, courts must also be sensitive to their
constitutional role, avoiding remedies that unduly entrench upon the
powers of other branches of government.73
As well, in Ward, the Supreme Court set out a new, functional
approach that governs awards of monetary damages under section 24(1).
Under this approach, damages are an appropriate and just remedy only
where monetary compensation serves a useful function by furthering the
general objects of the Charter.74 This will be the case where monetary
68
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damages serve the purpose of: (i) compensating the claimant for losses
caused by the Charter breach; (ii) vindicating constitutional values;
and/or (iii) deterring against future breaches.75 As the Court held,
achieving one or more of these objects is a basic prerequisite that must be
satisfied before damages will be an appropriate exercise of section 24(1)
discretion.
Importantly, these limitations on section 24(1) do not arise by statute.
They are, rather, imposed by the language of the provision, namely the
requirement that a Charter remedy be appropriate and just in the
circumstances. Thus, even on a purely textual analysis, the remedial
discretion under section 24(1) has its limits. Judges must weigh a host of
competing concerns when fashioning a remedy that is effective for the
claimant, respectful of limitations on judicial power and, with respect to
Charter damages, functional.
(b) Effective Administration of the State
When considering whether a Charter remedy meets the “appropriate and
just” requirement, concerns relating to good governance have weighed
heavily in the balance. In particular, Canadian courts have shown a clear
reluctance to impose a Charter remedy that will unduly interfere with the
effective administration of state functions. This limitation on the availability
of section 24(1) relief arises from the acknowledgement that the state must
be afforded some degree of protection from Charter relief, particularly
where the imposition of liability would impede the government’s policymaking, legislative and adjudicative functions.76
The jurisprudence in this area has developed primarily in the area of
Charter damages. In this context, courts have acknowledged that the
Crown benefits from some qualified immunities designed to protect
essential Crown functions from exposure to liability. This stipulation to
section 24(1) emanates primarily from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance).77 In that case, a
majority of the Court held that New Brunswick legislation abolishing
that province’s system of supernumerary judges violated the section
11(d) guarantee of judicial independence and was therefore
unconstitutional. Despite this finding of invalidity, the Court refused to
75
76
77

Id., at paras. 27-29.
Id., at para. 40.
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order damages on the basis that, absent conduct that is clearly wrong, in
bad faith or an abuse of power, the Crown enjoys immunity from liability
for conduct done pursuant to valid legislation.78 For this reason, it is
generally held that an action for damages under section 24(1) of the
Charter cannot be combined with an action for declarations of invalidity
under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.79
Mackin affirms that some Crown functions are so essential to the
effective administration of the state that their exercise should be
unimpeded by exposure to liability, including with respect to Charter
damages. In that case, for example, the interest deserving of protection
was the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental administration,
which would be undermined if duly enacted laws were not given their
full force and effect as long as they are not declared invalid.80 The
underlying rationale to this qualified immunity is that the state must be
afforded a measure of leniency for the free and effective discharge of
essential Crown functions:
The Mackin principle recognizes that the state must be afforded some
immunity from liability in damages resulting from the conduct of certain
functions that only the state can perform. Legislative and policy-making
functions are one such area of state activity. The immunity is justified
because the law does not wish to chill the exercise of policy-making
discretion.81

Eight years after Mackin, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ward
reaffirmed that the requirements of good governance may, in certain
cases, limit the availability of an award of Charter damages.82 In doing
so, the Court acknowledged that Mackin is not the only situation in
which section 24(1) damages should be avoided due to the negative
impacts that exposure to liability would have on the administration of
government.83 While the Court did not specifically identify any new
branches of qualified immunity — leaving it to future courts to define on
a case-by-case basis — it did acknowledge that “[d]ifferent situations
may call for different thresholds” and that courts may look to private law
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thresholds and defences for guidance in determining whether Charter
damages are appropriate and just.84
Since Ward, the Supreme Court has recognized at least one additional
branch of qualified Crown immunity from Charter damages, namely the
limited immunity given to prosecutors recognized in Henry v. British
Columbia (Attorney General).85 Henry brought an action against the
Crown for Charter damages arising from his false conviction and,
specifically, for the Crown’s failure to meet its disclosure obligations
under the Charter. Writing for the majority, Moldaver J. recognized that
the availability of Charter damages under section 24(1) is not unlimited,
particularly where the imposition of liability would impede essential
Crown functions, such as the administration of justice.86 In this regard,
he agreed that a heightened per se threshold of intentionality is needed to
protect against “exposing prosecutors to an unprecedented scope of
liability that would affect the exercise of their vital public function.”87
Where a Charter claimant fails to plead or prove facts to support a
finding on this threshold requirement, damages will not be appropriate
and just as a rule and without consideration of the case-specific
framework prescribed by Ward.88 By contrast, the Chief Justice and
Karakatsanis J. declined to recognize any per se immunity from Charter
damages, finding that concerns regarding good governance should instead
be considered under the Ward framework on a case-by-case basis.89
In many ways, Cromwell J.’s decision in Ernst builds on Henry by
confirming that not every allegation of Charter damages must proceed to
an individualized, case-by-case consideration of whether Charter
damages are appropriate and just.90 Rather, the Crown should benefit
from certain qualified exclusions from Charter damages, designed to
protect governmental functions from the negative side-effects that would
result from exposure to Charter liability:
Underlying the question of whether Charter damages could be an
appropriate remedy is a broader issue. It concerns how to strike an
appropriate balance so as to best protect two important pillars of our
democracy: constitutional rights and effective governments. ... Granting
84
85
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Charter damages may vindicate Charter rights, provide compensation
and deter future violations. But awarding damages may also inhibit
effective government, and remedies other than damages may provide
substantial redress for the claimant without having that sort of broader
adverse impact. Thus there is a need for balance with respect to the
choice of remedies.91

For claims against judges and quasi-judicial decision-makers, this
balance tips decidedly in favour of immunity from Charter damages.
As Cromwell J. concludes, the traditional justifications for judicial
immunity at common law (i.e., to protect the administration of justice
and judicial independence by permitting decision-makers to make
decisions free from interference and without distraction or threat of
litigation) resonate equally in the Charter context.92 Interestingly,
however, Cromwell J. also relies upon the availability of alternative
remedies to justify this threshold limitation, perhaps suggesting a
reversal of the Ward framework in which the complete list of
countervailing considerations may also be considered at the threshold
stage to justify qualifications to the availability of Charter damages.
As these cases show, the appropriate and just requirement also imposes
internal qualifications to the availability of Charter damages arising from
concerns regarding the impact that exposure to liability may have on the
effective administration of the state. Importantly, these qualifications can, in
certain contexts, be a complete bar to a Charter damages claim. As such,
these qualifications further define the boundaries of section 24(1) and, in our
view, must inform any assessment of the constitutionality of any external
derogation to section 24(1)’s remedial powers.
(c) Procedural Limitations
While the Charter does not prescribe any procedural rules of its own,
it does not exist in a procedural vacuum. Rather, section 24(1) operates
concurrently with, and does not replace, procedural rules of general
application.93 This is to say that constitutional claimants must comply
with the ordinary rules of practice, procedure, and evidence of the court
in which their claim is made. This is despite the fact that a failure to
comply with such rules might defeat an otherwise valid claim and preclude
91
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the availability of effective and meaningful relief under section 24(1).94
Compliance with procedural rules must therefore be understood as
an intrinsic prerequisite to any appropriate and just remedy under
section 24(1), rather than an external derogation of the remedial
jurisdiction given by the section.
In addition to codes of procedure, there are a number of other
constitutionally valid procedural qualifications to the availability of
section 24(1) relief. Statutory limitation periods are one example. As the
Supreme Court has confirmed, limitation periods of general application are
applicable to constitutional cases, including claims for personal relief
under section 24(1).95 In Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan, for example, the
Court did not question the applicability of Saskatchewan’s limitation
statute to a claim for personal relief under section 24(1), despite the fact
that the application of the limitation period had the effect of defeating a
widow’s equality claim for Charter damages.96 Four years later, in
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court
confirmed that claims for personal remedies can be barred by the running
of a limitation period.97 In this way, the Supreme Court appears to agree
that the purpose of limitation periods are as valid in the context of an
action for Charter damages as for any other type of claim, such that it
would neither be appropriate nor just to grant a section 24(1) remedy in the
face of a claimant’s failure to comply with these statutory rules.98
While the constitutional legitimacy of statutory limitation periods of
general application is therefore clear, case law suggests that courts may
question the constitutional validity of short, specialized limitation periods,
particularly where they have the effect of immunizing the Crown from
effective constitutional review.99 In Prete v. Ontario, for example, the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that a six-month limitation period for actions
against the Crown did not apply to an action for damages under
section 24(1).100 While this result may conflict with Ravndahl, we agree
with Hogg et al. that the result is consistent with the proposition, described
94
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above, that section 24(1) operates within the existing framework of
Canadian law. To the extent that a statutory qualification on section 24(1)
erects a more onerous procedural framework for constitutional claims that
has the effect of insulating against constitutional review, the validity of
such a rule is probably suspect.101
Another constitutionally valid procedural limitation on the availability
of section 24(1) relief is the statutory requirement that constitutional
claimants notify Attorneys General of their intention to seek constitutional
relief. Indeed, the failure of Ms. Ernst to comply with this requirement was
the basis upon which Abella J. was prepared to dispose of her action.
This is for good reason. As Abella J. rightly points out, notice requirements
serve an important purpose, both for governments and courts. With respect
to the former, governments should be afforded a full opportunity to support
the constitutionality of their legislation or actions. Regarding the latter,
notification ensures that courts have a full evidentiary record, including
justificatory evidence, before invalidating legislation. In light of the
important function served by notice requirements, there should be no
doubt that non-compliance is also a constitutionally valid limitation on the
availability of section 24(1) relief.
Given that the Charter does not prescribe its own procedural code, it
is a practical necessity that the existing framework of procedural rules
apply equally to the adjudication of Charter claims. The existing procedural
landscape should therefore be regarded as internal to section 24(1), further
defining the boundaries of what is an appropriate and just Charter
remedy. Understood in this way, procedural limitations on the availability
of Charter relief are constitutionally sound insofar as they are rules of
general application and/or do not have the purpose or effect of insulating
against effective and meaningful constitutional relief.
11. A Framework for Assessing the Constitutionality of Statutory
Immunity
Certain commentators have questioned the applicability of statutory
immunity provisions in the section 24(1) context, arguing that this would
appear inconsistent with the principles of the rule of law and/or
constitutional supremacy.102 Put another way, should a statutory
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provision be able to set limits on a claim brought under a constitutional
provision?
This question is perhaps not as easily answered as it might first
appear. As we have illustrated above, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
acknowledges the legitimacy of certain constraints, including statutory
ones, surrounding the provision of relief under section 24(1). These
existing limitations provide important context when assessing the
constitutionality of statutory immunity provisions like section 43 of
the ERCA. To the extent that an immunity or limitations provision is
consistent with these recognized constraints on the availability of
section 24(1) relief, concerns about the rule of law or constitutional
supremacy should not arise. These provisions may serve an important
constitutional purpose by flagging those areas in which there is
legitimate concern that exposure to liability will have an unacceptably
damaging impact on good governance.
With respect to limitations on the availability of section 24(1) that go
beyond those already acknowledged by the jurisprudence, such
limitations would more easily be regarded as constitutionally inconsistent
insofar as they have the purpose, or effect, of immunizing against
effective and meaningful Charter relief. Even where this is the case,
however, the jurisprudence described above suggests that such
limitations may still be justified by the Crown. While such justification
will often arise from concerns regarding good governance, Cromwell J.’s
decision in Ernst suggests that other factors, such as the availability of
alternative remedies, may also be considered.

III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Ernst is perhaps most likely to be recognized as a
“stepping stone” decision, as it leaves its most important and
interesting issue unanswered: whether and in what circumstances a
statutory immunity provision can bar a claim for Charter damages. This
is not to say, however, that Ernst is jurisprudentially insignificant. The
decision lays the groundwork and provides signposts for future cases,
in particular emphasizing the Court’s need for an adequate factual
record to consider these issues. The decision also lays bare fundamental
divisions within the Supreme Court regarding the availability of
Charter damages, particularly in the face of statutory or common law
immunities. As one commentator notes, these divisions are reflective of
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a broader debate regarding the appropriate role, if any, that traditional
private law immunities should play in governing the availability of
Charter relief.103 For now, however, Ernst leaves the Court planted in
the middle, acknowledging both the need for meaningful Charter relief
while also accommodating the numerous existing, constitutionally
valid, and reasonable limits on section 24(1).
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